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INTERNATIONALIZATION TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Edited by Frank Barnaby, Jozef Goldblat,
and Bhupendra Jasani. London: Taylor and Francis (Published for
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 1980. Pp.
xxv, 224.
THE NPT: THE MAIN POLITICAL BARRIER TO NUCLEAR
WEAPON PROLIFERATION. Edited by Frank Barnaby, Jozef
Goldblat, and Nacha Levinson. London: Taylor and Francis (Published for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)
1980. Pp. viii, 66.*
The fundamental reality of proposals to internationalize the
nuclear fuel cycle, or sensitive portions of the cycle, is that the
maximum (or even minimum) utilization of nuclear power is inconsistent with that degree of international control required to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. An agonizing choice must be
made between control and the proliferation of nuclear reactors,
including the fast breeders. Although the developing world, including the developing nations and even some OPEC members,
desperately require additional sources of energy, the nuclear club
(as personified by the London Club 1 ) is greatly concerned over the
diversion of nuclear waste materials, such as plutonium, that can
be manufactured into bombs.
This basic conflict is all too apparent within the framework of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
wherein articles I and III seek to control the spread of nuclear
* As is the practice of the SIPRI with its series of volumes, the names of the authors,
editors, and researchers are indicated at the end of the preface. Frank Barnaby is the
Director of the SIPRI, and the other editors are senior members of the research staff.
The London Club (also referred to as the London Suppliers Club or the London Nuclear
Suppliers Group) is an unofficial group of government representatives of industrialized
states, seeking to safeguard the export of nuclear materials. Their deliberations are held
in camera. These fifteen nuclear suppliers have agreed to the Guidelines for Nuclear
Transfers, which apply strict conditions for the export of an agreed list of nuclear items.
Considerable resentment has arisen among the developing nations. Nonetheless, the controls have proved largely ineffective because supervision over materials ceases once they
have passed into the possession of recipient states.
Seven nuclear supplier states met in London in 1975: Canada, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. They
have been joined by eight others: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic,
Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Article I of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) provides:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any
way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture
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weapons. Relatively weak measures of implementation are
contained in article III; they are reinforced to some extent by articles V and VI, seeking to prevent proliferation. The controversial fourth article seeks the "'fullest possible exchange' of peaceful
nuclear equipment, materials and technology, and co-operation with
the peaceful nuclear energy programme of the non-nuclear weapon
states."' The curtailment of the spread of nuclear power undoubtedly will become much more difficult during the 1980's, simply
because of national aspirations on the part of states to "go nuclear."
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
during the period it prepared for the second review conference
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), reiterated its firm position:
the SIPRI has opted in favor of maximum international control to stop
the nuclear arms race and also to restrict severely even the spread
of peaceful nuclear power." In particular, the SIPRI seeks to curtail
the use of fast breeder reactors in order to control the supply of
plutonium, the primary source material for nuclear devices.
Still, it would be incorrect to assume that the SIPRI and its
distinguished panel of experts are insensitive to the needs of the
developing world to obtain adequate sources of energy; rather, an
extremely difficult choice has been made in order to further global
disarmament and to achieve world peace.
As is true of all who are dedicated to the peaceful uses of nuclear
power, the SIPRI is equally sympathetic to the needs of developing
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II reinforces the above commitment, as follows:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE N.P.T.: THE MAIN POLITICAL BARRIER TO NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION chs. 1 & 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as THE N.P.T.].
But cf. WOODLIFFE, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVISITED, 27 N.I.L.R. 40 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
The dilemma-appreciated by all states from the beginning of the atomic ageposed by nuclear energy, lies in the fact that the technology used in its development for both peaceful purposes and military purposes are in much of their course
interchangeable and interdependent.
Compare the non-proliferation stand of the SIPRI: "The discrimination that such a two-tier
system entails will be viewed by non-nuclear-weapon states as a further violation of their
right to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." THE N.P.T., at 67.
3 THE N.P.T., supra note 2, at 24.
4 The position of the SIPRI, rejecting the use of nuclear energy in favor of other alternatives such as solar power, is set forth in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION (1979) [hereinafter cited
as NUCLEAR ENERGY]. Gormley, Book Review, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 687 (1981).

19821

BOOK REVIEW

states that view with hostility attempts by the United States to
restrict the free flow of nuclear information. Developing countries
contend, with considerable justification, that any restriction on the
transfer of technology is a violation not only of the new international economic order but also of the "new international law." In
fact, the entire field of development law is placed at issue, because
the developing countries allege that such controls, as contained
in the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, constitute a
type of colonialism designed to hamper their industrial progress.
Not by chance, the SIPRI believes that "it may now be time to
reconsider the policy of unilaterally imposed restrictions and to
prepare the ground for the negotiation of mutually acceptable
restraints between suppliers and recipients of nuclear material and
equipment." 5
The SIPRI, therefore, seeks possible solutions to the dilemma.6
Prior efforts, such as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
(INFCE), were generally unsuccessful in confronting the dangers
posed by nuclear power. But the INFCE Conference in 1977 did
create an awareness of the need for "international action to tackle
the nuclear proliferation dilemma."' In line with the position of
the SIPRI, the conclusion was: "The time is clearly ripe for concerted steps towards co-operation between suppliers and recipients
leading to internationalization of the sensitive parts of the nuclear
fuel cycle."8
The two books under review, and earlier publications, 9 offer a
number of possible solutions, both temporary in nature and
piecemeal, as well as all-encompassing plans. Beyond question, the
major contribution of the 1980 books (unlike some of the earlier
studies that were concerned primarily with the technical and scientific aspects of the nuclear problem) is that a series of concrete
solutions, accompanied by precise recommendations, are advanced:
bilateral arrangements between participating governments (suppliers and recipients), increased competence by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the use of regional agreements.
This latter proposal is supported strongly by the reviewer because
considerable progress has been made by European regional instituTHE N.P.T., supra note 2, at 30.
Id. at 30-32.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 31.
'See, e.g., NUCLEAR ENERGY, supra note 4, in connection with STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION (1980);

Gormley, Book Review, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNArL L. 229 (1981).
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tions in such areas as economic integration, environmental issues,
and the protection of human rights. The success of EURATOM
(functioning within the philosophy of the IAEA), including its relations with third states, can be cited as legal precedent for regional
and international cooperation. 10 The detailed proposal of SIPRI is
set forth in Part One of Internationalizationto Prevent the Spread
of Nuclear Weapons." In the first instance, "internationalization"
serves as the ultimate objective. In the opinion of SIPRI, it is the
only viable solution to halt the present arms race. In another sense,
"internationalization" serves as the umbrella, or the philosophical
concept, pursuant to which precise proposals can be contributed.
It appears that the SIPRI utilizes "internationalization" in a manner
somewhat reminiscent of "social justice," as the concept is codified
in the Constitution of the International Labour Organization. 2 Internationalization in the future could be treated as a phase of social
justice. That is to say, future consideration of internationalization
of the nuclear fuel cycle may provide for the evolution of a fully
mature philosophical concept that can aid the cause of disarmament and world peace.
As indicated above, the SIPRI has made the difficult, indeed
agonizing choice to restrict the spread of plutonium from which most
nuclear devices are manufactured. 3 This stand foresees the restriction (and even the eventual elimination) of fast breeder reactors,
which may be necessary for the future of nuclear power due to
the fairly limited supply of uranium, a non-renewable resource.
However, the position taken is that a double-tier system of control such as that applied by the United States should be followed,
whereby materials and even information are withheld from nonnuclear countries. Although this system (originally supported by
the Club of London) began to break down when West German firms
exported a reactor to Brazil, there still remains considerable support in favor of the two-tier approach, notwithstanding bitter op-

10 As concerns the issue of the superiority of regional solutions over United Nations
programs relative to environmental protection, as a fundamental human right, see W.

GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

(1976).
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Lodgaard, The Role of Institutional Measures in Strengthening the Non-Proliferation
INTERNATIONALIZATION, id. at 109-23. See infra note 13.
" See, e.g., Larson, Internationalizationof the Fuel Cycle: The PotentialRole of International Organizations,in INTERNATIONALIZATION, id. at 207-18.
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position from the developing world. The strong criticism that continues of plans to restrict the transfer of technology could prove
fatal to attempts to sustain the two-tier system and to internationalize sensitive stages in the fuel cycle, as SIPRI and its panel
of experts seek to establish a binding regime of internationalization through an international consensus of states. Essential is a
consensus for restricting nuclear energy to peaceful uses. 4 No spinoff of materials would be permitted, and no materials could be
diverted to weapons manufacture, provided the international
system of controls is sufficiently strong to prevent any clandestine
diversions similar to those that have occurred during the past
decade. Any system of regional and international regulation of
plutonium must be supported by legal, political, and economic
sanctions.
Recognized, but not thoroughly discussed, is the growing danger
of terrorist intervention. Not only may nuclear facilities be seized,
but diverted plutonium, or spent fuel, can be converted into
primitive bombs. The possibility of such terrorist use of atomic
devices haunts civilized governments. Consequently, adequate
safeguards must be provided by the world community.
Fundamental to the arrival at regional, and ultimately international, consensus is the surrender of significant portions of national
sovereignty to multinational authorities, as demonstrated by
EURATOM and to a lesser degree the IAEA. In addition to inherent opposition raised by the industrialized powers, especially
the present nuclear club, newly independent states are jealous of
their sovereign rights;, furthermore, this assertion of absolute
sovereignty is reinforced by the need for additional sources of
energy.
It will be difficult, as is evidenced by the results of the second
review conference of the NPT, to arrive at the basic consensus
between governments, much less a definitive course of action.
However, the SIPRI continues to strive in this direction as an essential phase of its efforts to support world-wide disarmament, simply
because any treaty commitments must be based upon mutual agreement. Similar consensus lies at the base of any new multinational
or international institutions that may be created.
The objective, indeed the absolute necessity, is to include all
states within the scope of the NPT and any newly established support structures. Incorporated within this goal is universal member" Meerburg, A New InternationalConsensus in the Field of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful
Purposes, in INTERNATIONALIZATION, id. at 77-81.
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ship in the IAEA. As implied above, two courses of action are possible: first, the creation of new institutions, and second, the utilization and expansion of existing organizations. This latter alternative
appears to be the most practical: EURATOM and the IAEA can
be accorded enlarged jurisdiction. As existing institutions are concerned primarily with the peaceful uses of nuclear power, they
will be in a position to facilitate further peaceful applications of
nuclear energy and, simultaneously, regulate excess materials that
might be used to manufacture weapons.
The specific recommendations discussed in the two books would
implement the broader plan (by the creation of an international
plutonium storage facility or an international fuel bank) that will
support the objectives set forth in articles I and II of the NPT,
the programs of the IAEA, the goals of the INFCE, and the experiments of newly created institutions.
The reviewer believes, as does the SIPRI, that An International
5 the title of Dr. Siazon's
Fuel Bank,"
chapter, is a key point in the
establishment of any viable scheme of regulation. Indeed, the creation of such fuel banks is an underlying proposal found in the series
of books, for the reason that materials can be controlled while
simultaneously assuring an adequate supply of materials for
peaceful purposes. Included within the scope of a "pool" would be
provision for the storage, indeed the safeguard, of spent reactor
fuel. The danger of diversion to armaments manufacture by potential military users, including even terrorist groups, must be
eliminated if any planned experiment of internationalization is to
succeed.
The methods by which these objectives are to be realized are
set forth in the chapters devoted to the "institutional contribution" that will attempt to implement the recommendations. Consequently, functioning as the conclusions to the study and to the
SIPRI's position, the possible institutional framework is advanced.
Dr. B.W. Lee stresses regional planning, a position supported by
the reviewer. Henceforth, regional planning could achieve positive
results, at least in the immediate future. The desirability of regional
planning was recognized at the first NPT review conference in
1975. In this instance, it is proposed that states in close proximity
pool their resources. As a result, regional institutions will be
substituted for national centers and facilities, until such time as
international machinery becomes functional.
In the opinion of this reviewer, the most important chapter in

11Siazon, An

InternationalFuel Bank, in

INTERNATIONALIZATION,

id. at 135-41.
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the book is: Multinational Arrangements for Enriching and Processing, by I. Smart."6 Here, the reality of any international control of the nuclear fuel cycle (or in fact of any disarmament plan)
becomes apparent. States, particularly nuclear powers, must undertake binding treaty commitments with which all states, including
those not members of the United Nations, will comply. When dealing with potential weapons of mass destruction, universal acceptance becomes mandatory. While the economic and social benefits
to all participating countries are considerable, such agreements
in themselves cannot prevent proliferation.
Obviously, multinational fuel arrangements cannot prevent proliferation, any more than international safeguards can do so, if only
because a country determined to produce nuclear explosives, or
to keep a weapon option open, will either stand aside or withdraw
from them. However, as a complement to safeguards, multinationalization can present an additional deterrent to proliferation,
in that a country subscribing to it must expect to incur some
political penalty if it violates or renounces multinational obligations
in order to obtain nuclear explosives.17
Smart is forced to concede: "No general solution to the problem
of technology transfer under multinational process arrangements
is plausible. The issue will have to be negotiated on a case-by-case
basis."' 8 All too obviously, excluded governments will believe (or
at the very least allege) that they have been the victims of
discriminatipn, even though such grant or denial of technology and
materials is determined pursuant to an international convention.
Although not discussed in the books, some form of international
adjudication, for example non-binding conciliation, arbitration, or
judicial settlement, may be required. Realistically, any system of
control will result in disputes between states that are parties to
multinational conventions. Perhaps the adjudicative machinery accepted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea might suggest possible systems of conflict-resolution that could
be duplicated within the scope of the IAEA and a revised NPT.
In seeking international treaty commitments, and even less formal arrangements more in the nature of contracts, elements of
flexibility and security are sought, because "security is, in fact,
the key to the success of any multinational fuel cycle arrangement
" Gustafsson, InternationalStorage of Spent Reactor Fuel Elements, in
id. at 161-69.
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* .*. . But those concerned to develop peaceful uses of nuclear
energy will also demand that any multinational agreement should
serve security."'9 If this end cannot be achieved, "potential participants in multinational arrangements will instead create that
sort of choice by embarking upon enrichment or reprocessing on
a national basis."' None of us should minimize the significance of
this alternative: no provision in the NPT prevents a state from
developing its own nuclear capacity for legitimate peaceful purposes, and no restraints can be imposed upon non-adherents to the
treaty (e.g. France, China, Israel, and South Africa), as the SIPRI
is all too aware.
Lawyers, scientists, political scientists, and decision-makers are
aware of the fact that international agreements create binding
obligations; however, the enforcement of these commitments too
frequently is not forthcoming. Consequently, systems of sanctions
drawn from both private and public international law will be required because existing measures at the disposal of the IAEA,
EURATOM, or national systems such as the United States Nuclear
Energy Agency, are limited. The moral sanction from classical international law will deter those states dedicated to the rule of law.
Similarly, violations by peaceful users are more readily subject
to eventual compliance, as the mere threat of suspension of
necessary supplies, such as nuclear fuel, can remedy the situation.
Political pressure from a supplier will have profound effects on
recipient states. Yet, as Dr. Szasz observes: "it still remains true
that a control system devoid of sanctions is perceived to be incomplete and thus ineffective . . . [for] . . . peoples and governments will be unwilling to entrust their security in this field to
a system that appears to be inadequate."'"
Dr. Szasz suggests the evolution of a control system, in view
of the fact that traditional political and economic sanctions are likely
to be ineffective against a determined violator. He believes, and
correctly so, that measures taken against the offending state's
nuclear facilities will, in the immediate instance, prove largely ineffective because such counter measures as stockpiling can anticipate termination of supplies. Therefore, if sanctions are to have
the effect of forcing compliance with prior treaties, the interna-

19

20

1

Id. at 195.
Id.
Szasz, Sanctions as an Aspect of InternationalNuclear Fuel Cycles, in INTERNATIONALIZA-

TION, id. at 197-205; Szasz, Sanctions as InternationalNuclear Controls, 11 CONN. L. REV. 545,

563 (1979).
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tional fuel cycle at the very least must have been partially internationalized, in order that significant phases of the fuel cycle can
be disrupted as a means of sanctioning. For this to occur, the offending state must be dependent upon the regional or international
cycle and fuel bank. Obviously, the most serious offense would be
the diversion of materials to weapons production. Still there might
be clandestine shipments to other non-military users in violation
of the original agreement, possibly to achieve a nationally independent nuclear capability or even for use as a shield against future
sanctions. This latter danger will be ever-present when states attempt to assert their sovereign authority. Nevertheless, the author
maintains that "by internationalizing part of the fuel cycle and expecting or especially requiring states to rely on that part of the
cycle, any attempts by the latter to achieve nuclear self-sufficiency
would be negated."2 If such a system exists, the cost of imposing
such sanctioning measures will be reduced.
Remaining unresolved is the role to be assumed by sanctioning
authorities, acting individually pursuant to their authority, or with
the cooperation of member states. Within this context, an additonal
possibility may be considered. Valuable precedent exists in the
sanctioning authority of the supranational European Communities
(EC), primarily against non-governmental entities, companies, and
private persons. While the sanctioning authority of the Court of
Justice and supporting community organs is less effective against
member states, compliance has been forthcoming largely due to
the moral force of its judgments. Accordingly, an examination of
EC enforcement measures, as also contained within EURATOM
and the EEC treaties, can support some of the goals sought.
Valuable procedures, such as the employment of municipal forums
to enforce judgments, might be emulated.
The final chapter, which actually serves as a summary and conclusion to the book, is correlated rather effectively with the SIPRI
viewpoint as set forth in Part I of the book. The special contribution of Dr. Larson is that he deals with the potential role of international organizations.' Beginning with the need to reestablish the
dialogue, and, it is hoped, arriving at a consensus through the
INFCE, it is mandatory that political and legal commitments be
reached, at least among the leading nuclear states. Any future accomplishment lies in the political realm. "A consensus developed
Szasz, Sanctions as an Aspect of InternationalNuclear Fuel Cycles, in INTERNATIONALIZAat 203.
" Larson, supra note 13.

TION, supra note 11,
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among the participants that although technological developments
may help to achieve non-proliferation objectives, the more promising
area for future action lies in the development of institutional
arrangements." 4
Rather than propose new institutions, a more conservative recommendation is advanced, based on international cooperation at
several levels. At the first stage, harmonization of practices can
result from direct cooperation. (This reviewer wonders why the
precedent of the Nordic Council has not been cited as a possible
example, as for instance the Scandinavian practice of the harmonization of national legislation?) In addition to states, private parties
and nongovernmental entities should be included, thereby incorporating private law solutions. National law, regulations, and codes
of conduct should be harmonized or even coordinated. Within this
approach, "national regulations for storage and transport of spent
fuel and for waste management [should] be harmonized with a view
25
to the formulation of internationally agreed codes of conduct.
Joint ventures, for example multinational commercial joint ventures, will bring private enterprise within the internationalized
structure, as for example, private investment. Basic to such recommendations are the benefits that will accrue to all participants in
fuel cycle management and arrangements.
The public law counterpart of such multinational cooperation is
the potential role of international organizations, in terms of the
goals of participating governments. Realistically, opposition must
be surmounted if the IAEA is to be given a greater degree of competence, despite the present political climate within the United
Nations. As implied by Dr. Larson, and generally by the SIPRI,
broader utilization of the IAEA is the preferred solution, at least
for the present. Consequently, the INFCE, the NPT, and the
Statute of the IAEA serve as the foundation for a continuing
dialogue between states (and nongovernmental entities), a consensus (at regional and international levels), and finally an expanded
IAEA. The NPT and the Statute of the IAEA also can serve as
the springboard for future activities, which in turn can lead toward
new regional and international organizations. As previously indicated in regard to sanctions, EURATOM can serve as the inspiration, and even legal precedent, for other regional groupings.
Regional fuel centers also support the IAEA.1 In particular, both
2, Id. at 208.
:5

Id.

at 210.

20 THE N.P.T., supra note 2, at 31.
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books under review stress the absolute necessity of a halt to nuclear
testings. Within this context, the creation of nuclear free zones
offers the opportunity to safeguard at least some portions of the
earth's environment, as can be seen from existing nuclear free zones
in the Indian Ocean area and in North Africa.
The thoughtful recommendations proposed by the SIPRI and the
distinguished panel of authors are realistic in terms of the "attainable" in view of the East-West split, the confrontation in the
North-South dialogue, and the deterioration of detente between
the superpowers. Notwithstanding the fact that new solutions undoubtedly will be forthcoming, the available "possibilities" were
prepared for the recently concluded second review conference of
the NPT. Although additional refinements can be made by further research, realistic solutions have been offered in light of the
contemporary deterioration of international relations coupled with
the growing demand for additional sources of energy. 7 These
demands for new sources must not be underrated.
If a negative approach were adopted, it would be relatively simple to atack the proposals and recommendations that seek to implement the internationalization of nuclear power, particularly in
view of the disappointing results of the 1980 NPT Second Review
Conference, the controversy over the pending SALT II agreement,
and the impasse at the Madrid Review Conference of the Helsinki
Declaration. Beyond question, it will be extremely difficult even
to establish negotiations between existing nuclear states; there
is little likelihood of military powers reaching a consensus to ban
weapons; and the establishment of international machinery more
properly should be considered as a longer range objective. The
SIPRI and its dedicated participants have recognized and discussed
those issues that must be surmounted in order to preserve our
planet earth and its peoples. The reality of the present situation
is that a significant bloc of states has withheld adherence to the
NPT; only limited aspects are covered by the NPT; the existing
NPT is too limited in its scope; and a few states can disrupt and
even destroy any international order. Israel, South Africa, and
Pakistan pose special threats. Also, France and the People's
Republic of China have opted to retain their complete freedom of
action as an expression of their national sovereignty. Even the
Brazilian policies have caused considerable concern.
The SIPRI is fully aware of these problems, which have been
" See, e.g., Hannerz, Energy Independence via Nuclear Power with Minimized WeaponProliferation Risks, in INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 11, at 125-27.
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examined in a scholarly and objective manner. As indicated earlier
in this review, the books render a permanent contribution to
literature. Despite the disappointing results of the 1980 NPT Second
Review Conference, these books have not become obsolete; they
will be consulted for the remainder of this century, because the
SIPRI has offered a realistic plan for internationalization that can
serve as a basis for further study and research.
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